Ethical Relativism

Conceiving of ethics as a mountain with many paths raises the question of which path to follow. In moral philosophy this is identified as the problem of pluralism. How are we to choose among different ethical theories when each is supported by reasoning that makes sense to at least some moral philosophers? 

We might argue that one theory is right and the others are wrong, but that seems unlikely and unreasonable.

Alternatively, we might conclude that we have no way to know whether any of these ethical theories are right—that ethics is nothing but “different strokes for different folks.”30 This would mean that what individuals think is right is right for them, and that this is true for every culture. Philosophers refer to these notions as individual and cultural relativism.

Many of us are relativists to some extent, because we think people should be free to make their own moral choices as long as no one else is harmed. In law, this is reflected in property laws and the right of privacy.

We may also argue, however, that some land use choices—such as watering your lawn when there is a drought, or clear-cutting forests on private land—should be restrained by governments to protect the environment and promote the public good. If you agree that personal freedom should be limited in some way, even when there is no direct harm to others, you are not completely a moral relativist. 

Cultural relativism poses a more difficult question, as history and anthropology reveal that human cultures have evolved diverse ethical standards. Does this mean that ethical reasoning simply rationalizes the customs and values of a culture? To assess this claim, I suggest we assume that the answer is yes, and consider the implications of this position.

If values are merely the customs of various cultures, this would mean that values are whatever the majority in a society believes is right. But if this were so, how could values change, as they obviously do? A change in cultural values begins with a minority arguing that some values are better than others, which would be unpersuasive if we really believed that all values are relative. 

Changes in cultural values are evidence that experience and ideas have led many people to change their mind about what is right and good, or better.  Cultures are not simply different games played by different rules, but instead reflect diverse patterns of reasoning that people modify as they experience alternative ways of living.

This argument against cultural relativism does not imply that it is reasonable to believe there is a single version of ethics, which every culture should accept. Nor does it prove the existence of universal or absolute values. As a discipline of thought, “Ethics has universal intent.”31 But as long as moral philosophers argue rationally for different ethical theories, we should expect that cultures will continue to have diverse values.

Nonetheless, the nature of ethical reasoning presumes that some actions and ways of being are better than others.

Moreover, the presumptions of international human rights law affirm that some actions, such as torture, are absolutely wrong, and other human rights, such as the presumption of innocence, are absolutely right—and that these rights should be universally enforced. The reasoning behind these claims is Western in origin, but has now been affirmed within many cultures, which is evidence that our moral community is becoming global.32

analogy to rule of law 
constructing presumptions
critical reasoning
faith and reason
environmental ethics 
ethical traditions
feelings
right and good 
testing presumptions

30.  See http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=different+strokes+for+different+folks.

31.  Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III, “Introduction: Ethics and Environmental Ethics,” in Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III, eds., Environmental Ethics, 5.

32.  Chapters in part 3 offer evidence for this claim, as does Robert Traer, Faith in Human Rights: Support in Religious Traditions for a Global Struggle (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1991).

   Diverse ways...

Is this ancient philosopher asleep or deep in thought? Thinking about the problem of moral relativism could lead to either.

The many paths up the mountain metaphor allows us to envision that more than one path might reach the top. Moreover, the diverse ways of reasoning on "mount ethics" need not be seen as contradictory.

For example, our duty to treat other persons with respect means that we should recognize their human rights. But we might affirm a duty with respect to other animals that does not involve ascribing individual rights of all other organisms.

Our duty and rights in the world of human culture defines a different path on "mount ethics" than our duty with respect to animals. We should act to preserve endangered species, but in doing so do not have to recognize the rights of individual animals.